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Cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) to manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known 
as transfer prices) to shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Such behavior 
reduces the aggregate tax burden of an MNE thus increasing its worldwide after-tax profits, which 
presumably increases stockholder value. However, this behavior also erodes the CIT bases of 
countries, like the United States and other OECD countries, with relatively high CIT rates. To 
mitigate such behavior, governments adopt and enforce anti-tax avoidance rules. In this paper, I 
seek to gauge the effect on profit shifting of CIT-rate differentials among countries. I improve 
upon the current practice to estimating this elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency 
with which countries enforce their anti-tax avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to 
enforce them. I report evidence showing that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax 
avoidance rules and the incentive to enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semi-
elasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical 
model. I estimate the empirical model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than 
40,000 affiliates located in 28 countries during the period from 2008 to 2014. To illustrate the 
practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical model, I 
conduct a policy simulation in which the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent.  
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1.  Introduction 
Policy-makers and the public alike are paying increasing attention to issues involving international 
taxation because, among other reasons, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are using increasingly 
sophisticated tax planning strategies to minimize their worldwide tax liabilities. For example, 
cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for MNEs to 
manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to 
shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Doing so, without detection by the 
tax authorities, decreases the MNE’s aggregate CIT liabilities and increases its worldwide after-
tax profits which, presumably, increases shareholder value. However, such behavior by MNEs 
erodes the tax bases of countries, like the United States and other OECD countries, with relatively 
high CIT rates. Clausing (2015) estimates that the United States lost $111 billion in federal CIT 
revenue in 2012 due to the illegal shifting by U.S.-based MNEs of $371 billion of corporate profits 
to foreign affiliates. 
Generally speaking, a country has two policy options at its disposal to deter so-called base 
erosion profit shifting (BEPS) by MNEs. They can cut the CIT rate and/or adopt and enforce anti-
tax avoidance regulations. Cutting the CIT rate to deter BEPS can be likened to international tax 
competition to attract mobile capital. The he risk of countries cutting CIT rates is that it will lead 
to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ where governments repeatedly cut CIT rates in response to the tax cuts 
of other countries in a repeated game of ‘tit-for-tat’. 
The existing literature on BEPS (see, for example, Hines Jr & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & 
Laeven, 2008; Lohse & Riedel, 2013), henceforth HR, HL, and LR, respectively, generally focuses 
on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT tax-rate differentials 
among countries (henceforth referred to simply as the semi-elasticity of reported profits).1 At this 
point, the alert reader may very well be puzzled. How does the semi-elasticity of reported profits 
allow tax policy analyst to conclude anything about the effect of CIT-rate differentials among 
countries on BEPS? The relationship between reported profits and BEPS is relatively 
                                                          
1 I estimate a semi-log specification of a model of reported profits. More specifically, the dependent variable in a 
semi-log specification of the model is the natural logarithm of an affiliate’s reported profits and, on the right-hand-
side of the regression equation, is the simple difference in the maximum statutory CIT rate of the host country of the 
affiliate and that of the host country of the MNE’s ultimate owner. As a result, the estimated coefficient of the CIT-
rate differential is a semi-elasticity rather than an elasticity which is the interpretation given to the estimated 
coefficient in a double-log specification (see Olsen & Osmundsen, 2003 for further details on these points). 
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straightforward. In contrast to reported profits which is observable, the true profits and the amount 
of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE’s affiliate is not observable. However, the reported 
profit of an MNE’s affiliate is equal to its true profit minus the net amount of outbound profit 
shifting, which may be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, minus 
the cost to the affiliate of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a 
foreign affiliate. In other words, the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate is a negative function of 
the net amount of outbound profit shifting in response to cross-country differences in CIT rates. 
This relationship allows us to infer the effect of CIT-rate differentials on BEPS from the semi-
elasticity of reported profits. This explains why the literature has settled upon this approach. 
In this paper, I show that the current ‘state-of-the-art’- empirical models of reported profits 
not only result in biased estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits but are also seriously 
misspecified. First, existing studies fail to account for the stringency with which countries enforce 
their transfer-pricing rules. Yet, countries with relatively high CIT rates are more likely to adopt 
and more stringently enforce transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS. Therefore, empirical models 
of reported profits which do not control for the stringency with which countries enforce their anti-
tax avoidance rules may result in inconsistent estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits 
due to omitted variable bias. To be fair, existing approaches to estimating the semi-elasticity of 
reported profits do include controls for the adoption of anti-tax avoidance regulations, particularly 
transfer-pricing rules, by countries over time. However, adopting transfer-pricing rules is 
necessary but not sufficient to mitigate BEPS. A country must also enforce its rules and apply 
penalties for detected violations by domestic affiliates of MNEs to deter BEPS.  
The second reason that existing practice may result in biased estimates of the semi-
elasticity of reported profits is that the CIT-rate differential is potentially endogenous because of 
international tax competition among countries aimed at stemming BEPS. Again, there are a few 
studies that use instrumental variables to estimate their models of reported profits; however, the 
overwhelming majority of studies do not appear to address this issue in the estimation of their 
models of reported profits. 
Third, and certainly most seriously, researchers have not accounted for the incentives of 
countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules in the specification of their empirical models of 
reported profits. More specifically, a country seeking to mitigate BEPS should only monitor the 




transfer-pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaged in intracompany transactions 
involving foreign affiliates located in countries with lower CIT rates than its own. Since a country’s 
tax administration must use scarce resources to enforce transfer-pricing rules, countries should not 
monitor the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany 
transactions involving the foreign affiliates located in countries with higher CIT rates than its own. 
In this case, the domestic affiliate has no incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate; to do so 
would increase the aggregate tax burden of the MNE. More specifically, countries with high CIT 
rates should use scarce administrative resources to monitor the transfer pricing practices of 
domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany transactions with foreign affiliates located 
in low CIT-rate countries. And, researchers striving to provide consistent estimates of the semi-
elasticity of reported profits should take these incentives into account when specifying and 
estimating an empirical model of reported profits.  
To address these three concerns, I construct a dummy variable for the stringency with 
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules. The enforcement dummy variable reflects both 
the level of transfer-pricing documentation that a country requires domestic affiliates of MNEs to 
submit with its annual CIT return, and the frequency with which the host country applies penalties 
for violations of its transfer-pricing rules. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable for a 
given country, the specification of the model accounts for whether the incentives facing the 
domestic affiliate of the MNE and thus whether the host country should monitor the affiliate’s 
transfer-pricing practices. As discussed in greater detail below, I show that the functional form of 
the empirical model must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the estimation of potentially three 
distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits. 
Following the existing literature, I estimate my model of reported profits using detailed 
firm-level data for the period 2008 to 2014. In contrast to the sample periods used in previous 
studies, my sample period spans the Great Recession.2 The sample, which is constructed from the 
Orbis database, contains information on 43,103 affiliates located in 28 countries. Since the sample 
includes affiliates with ultimate owners located in a variety of developing, developed, and tax 
haven countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the combinations of CIT-rate differentials 
and transfer-pricing enforcement regimes in my sample. This variation should be helpful in 
                                                          
2 Orbis is Bureau van Dijk's flagship database of private and listed company information from around the world that 
emphases the ownership linkages among firms that belong to the same multinational enterprise. 
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identifying the parameter estimates of the model. Using this sample, I estimate a firm-level, 
instrumental variables, fixed-effects, panel-data model of reported profits to gauge the effect of 
CIT-rate differentials among countries on reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate. 
I develop a theoretical model of tax motivated profit shifting which also accounts for the 
incentives of countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules. The comparative statics of the model 
show that there are potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits with respect to 
CIT-rate differentials among countries. Based on this finding, I specify an empirical model of 
reported profits which is sufficiently flexible to permit the simultaneous estimation of these three 
semi-elasticities of reported profits. Specifically, I estimate a semi-elasticity of reported profits 
when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit shifting because the host country of the 
MNE’s subsidiary (ultimate owner) has a greater CIT-rate than the host-country of the MNE’s 
ultimate owner (subsidiary). This accounts for two of the three semi-elasticities of reported profits. 
I estimate a third semi-elasticity of reported profits for the case in which neither country has 
adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them.  
My preferred estimate, when countries enforce their transfer-pricing rules, is -3.2 (-1.0) for 
the semi-elasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit 
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -3.2 implies that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate 
differential results in a 32 percent decrease in an affiliates’ reported profits due to outbound profit 
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -1.0 implies that a 10 percent decrease in the CIT-rate 
differential results in a 10 percent increase in an affiliates’ reported profits due to inbound profit 
shifting. My preferred estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profit when neither country has 
adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them is equal to -3.5, meaning that a ten percent 
increase in the CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in the affiliates’ reported 
profits. 
Finally, to illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly 
specifying the empirical model of reported profits, I conduct a policy simulation. I assume the 
United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percentage points, which results in a proposed-law CIT 
rate of 15 percent. This is approximately equal to the median CIT rate of OECD countries. I use 
my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as a single estimate of 
the semi-elasticity obtained using a state-of-the-art but seriously misspecified model to conduct 




the policy simulation. This exercise shows that using consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities 
obtained from a correctly specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated CIT tax revenue 
effect of the proposed reform. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief overview 
of the literature on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits. In particular, I focus on those 
studies that control for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules by countries over time. Section 3 
describes a simple theoretical model of tax motived profit shifting by MNEs and analyzes the 
comparative statics of the model. Section 4 describes the data and construction of the sample used 
to estimate the empirical model, the econometric specification of the model of profit shifting, and 
the construction of the variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. I report the results of 
the policy simulation in the subsequent section, and Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Literature review 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive review of the vast literature 
on BEPS.3 Therefore, we proceed below by reviewing some of the seminal papers in this literature. 
The literature on tax-motivated, international profit shifting focuses on gauging the effect 
of CIT-rate differentials on the reported profit of the affiliates of MNEs. Due to the large variety 
of methodologies, data, and sample periods used in this literature, it is difficult to compare 
estimates. Heckemeyer & Overesh (2013), however, seek to provide a consensus estimate of the 
semi-elasticity of reported profits by conducting a meta-analysis of the available estimates in the 
literature while controlling for the diversity of approaches. They report a consensus estimate of  
-0.8, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate differential among countries causes an 8 
percent decrease in the reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate. 
The literature on BEPS generally follows the practice introduced by HR. They assume that 
the true profit of an MNE’s affiliate is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function. They 
further assume that it is a function of capital, labor, and technological change. They use the natural 
logarithm of these variables as regressors in their empirical model to control for the true profits 
earned by the MNE’s affiliate in a given country. Using aggregate time-series data, HR and Gruber 
                                                          
3 See Heckemeyer & Overessh (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) for up-to-date and excellent reviews of the literature 
on BEPS. 
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& Mutti (1991) report evidence of a decrease in the reported profits of subsidiaries located in 
countries with high CIT rates. In addition to not accounting for the enforcement of anti-tax 
avoidance rules, they do not account for the role of CIT rates in other countries in which an MNE 
has a presence.  
To address the latter issue, HL estimate a model of reported profits using a 1999 cross-
section of firm-level data for 12 European countries. They use the weighted-average (by the size 
of the affiliate) CIT rates of countries in which an MNE has a presence to calculate the CIT-rate 
differential facing an MNE’s affiliate. They report an estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits 
with respect to the weighted-average, CIT-rate differential of -1.3. Dischinger, Knoll, & Riedel 
(2014) and Lohse & Riedel (2013) also report evidence consistent with BEPS by MNEs. They 
show that reported profits are greater (less) than predicted for affiliates located in countries with 
relatively low (high) CIT rates.  
To their credit, Dharmapala & Riedel (2013) and LR make an important methodological 
contribution to specification of models of reported profit by including a control variable for the 
existence of transfer-pricing rules by country and over time. As previously discussed, however, 
the mere existence of transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to deter BEPS. Countries 
must also enforce their anti-tax avoidance regulations if they are going to have a deterrent effect 
on the tax planning strategies of MNEs. Since I contend that the stringency with which a country 
enforces its transfer-pricing rules plays an important role in correctly specifying a model of 
reported profits and consistently estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits, I proceed below 
by carefully describing the approaches used in the literature to control for transfer-pricing rules by 
country and over time. 
Although Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) do not focus on the effect of transfer-pricing rules 
on BEPS, they do introduce a control variable for transfer-pricing rules as a robustness check of 
their estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. They do so by constructing an index of 
transfer-pricing rules for each country in their sample based on the following three criteria: (1) a 
country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules; (2) the country requires domestic affiliates of MNEs 
to provide transfer-pricing documentation with its annual CIT return; and (3) the country’s 
adoption of penalties for violating transfer-pricing rules. They estimate their model of reported 
profits using a sample of 16 countries. As expected, they report evidence that the responsiveness 




of reported value added to CIT-rate differentials among countries is stronger for observations in 
countries with less stringent rules than it is for observations located in countries with more 
stringent rules. The potential limitations of this approach are twofold. First, their estimate may not 
be identified because of the limited number of countries in their sample which may result in a lack 
of sufficient variation in the index of transfer-pricing rules. Second, and more importantly, their 
control variable for the existence of transfer-pricing rules does not account for whether countries 
are actually assessing penalties on domestic affiliates of MNEs for violations of their transfer-
pricing rules. 
Lohrse & Riedel (2012, 2013) also include an index for transfer-pricing rules based on a 
country’s documentation requirements. In their specification of the econometric model, they 
include an interaction term between the index for the existence of transfer-pricing rules and the 
CIT-rate differential among countries. This allows the estimate of semi-elasticity of reported 
profits to differ for affiliates of MNEs located in countries with documentation requirements and 
for those located in countries without such requirements. They conclude that transfer-pricing 
regulations are an important strategy for governments seeking to deter BEPS. However, they also 
do not account for whether countries actually enforce for their transfer-pricing rules.  
Klessen & Laplante (2012) look deeply into the interaction between the regulatory costs to 
an MNE’s affiliate of the “enforcement” of transfer-pricing rules and a proxy variable for income 
shifting. They estimate their model using a sample of MNEs located in the United States. Their 
measure of enforcement is the IRS audit rate for large corporations. This is arguably an imprecise 
measure of the enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. As a proxy for regulatory costs, they use the 
weighted average of the existence and enforcement of transfer-pricing rules among the major 
trading partners of the United States. They conclude that U.S. companies are becoming more active 
at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed over 
time. 
Beer & Loeprick (2013) study the effect of the introduction of transfer-pricing rules on the  
time path of reported profits. They find that within four years of introducing a rule requiring 
transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with an MNE’s annual CIT return, the reported 
profits of a subsidiary decreases by approximately 60 percent. Theirs is an innovative way of 
thinking about the regulator costs of transfer-pricing rules. At the risk of being repetitive, their 
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econometric specification does not include a control variable for whether a country actually 
enforces its documentation requirements. 
The present research makes the following contributions to the literature on BEPS. First, 
my econometric specification includes a control variable that accounts for the enforcement of 
transfer-pricing rules. This variable was painfully constructed using information gleaned from 
reviewing hundreds of reports issued by KPMG and Ernst & Young. Second, in constructing the 
enforcement dummy variable, I account for the incentives of the host country to enforce its 
transfer-pricing rules vis-à-vis a foreign affiliate of the MNE based on the prevailing CIT-rate 
differential between those the host countries. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable, I 
use the rules of the ultimate owner’s host country when that country’s top statutory CIT rate is 
greater than that of the foreign subsidiary’s host country and, vice versa, I use the rules of the 
foreign subsidiary’s host country when that country has a top statutory CIT rate that is greater than 
that of the ultimate owner’s host country. The rationale for constructing the enforcement dummy 
variable in this manner is straightforward: countries should only monitor the transfer-pricing 
practices when a domestic affiliate of an MNE is engaging in intracompany transactions with a 
foreign affiliate located in a country with a lower CIT rate than its own. When a domestic affiliate’s 
host country has a lower CIT rate than that for the foreign affiliate’s host country, there is simply 
no risk of BEPS.  
Third, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the theory, the specification of my 
empirical model is sufficiently flexible to allow for the simultaneous estimation of three separate 
semi-elasticities of reported profit. Fourth, the sample used to estimate the model includes a larger 
number of countries, including developing, developed, and tax haven countries, than those used in 
previous studies. Consequently, there is likely to be greater heterogeneity in the sample in terms 
of the combinations of CIT-rate differentials among countries and the values of the enforcement 
dummy variable used in this study. The added variation among the independent variables should 
be helpful in identifying estimated parameters of the model. Fifth, I estimate an instrument 
variables model to address the potential endogeneity of the CIT-rate differentials among countries 
in my sample. 
 




3.  A simple model of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE 
In this section, we describe a simple model of tax-motivated, international profit shifting of an 
MNE and derive the comparative statics of the model. The comparative static results of the model 
are useful in guiding the specification of the empirical model and also provide an entirely new set 
of testable hypotheses that are an important focus of the econometric exercise discussed in the 
subsequent section of this study. 
A fundamental concept in this section is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate, which is 
defined as follows: 
 πJ
R = πJ









𝑅 is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate j (= 1,…, n) located in country J (= 1,…, n); 
tJ is the CIT rate of country J; 𝜋𝑗
𝑇 is the true profit earned by the MNE in country J; Sj is the net 
amount of outbound profit shifting by the MNE’s affiliate j; and 𝛾𝐽𝑆𝑗
2 2𝜋𝑗
𝑇⁄  is the total cost to 
affiliate j of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a foreign affiliate. 
These costs are assumed to be increasing in the stringency with which country J enforces its anti-
tax avoidance rules, which is denoted by γJ. This policy parameter is assumed to be greater than 
or equal to zero. As discussed in greater detail below, I assume that γJ = 0, when country J has not 
incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing rules. In addition, the total costs of engaging in illegal 
profit shifting to a foreign affiliate is a positive function of the ratio of the square of the net amount 
of outbound profit shifting and the true profit of the MNE’s affiliate j. The quadratic specification 
of the cost function captures the assumption that the costs to the affiliate increase with the square 
of the net amount of illegal outbound profit shifting. 
Following HR and HL, we assume that an MNE seeks to maximize worldwide after-tax 
profits subject to the constraint that the sum of net outbound profit-shifting by all n affiliates of 
the MNE is equal to zero. Furthermore, I assume an affiliate’s net outbound profit shifting may be 
positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE in particular countries. The 
resulting constrained optimization problem can be written as follows: 
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subject to ∑ 𝑆𝑗 = 0
𝑛
𝑗=1 . 
To simplify the model, we assume that the MNE only has two affiliates: a foreign affiliate 
g located in country G, and an affiliate h located in the MNE’s home country H. The Lagrange 
expression for (2) is given by the following expression: 
 L = (1 − tG) ( 𝜋𝑔









) + (1 − tH) ( 𝜋ℎ








) − 𝜆(𝑆𝑔 + 𝑆ℎ). (3) 
Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that the sum of Sj must equal zero; tJ is the CIT 
rate of country J (= G, H); 𝜋𝑗
𝑇is the true profit of affiliate j (= g or h) earned in country J (= G or 
H, respectively); and Sj is the net amount of outbound profits being illegally shifted abroad by 
affiliate j (= g or h).  
Without loss of generality, we assume that the CIT rate of country G is greater than that of 
country H or tG – tH > 0. Given the tax incentives created by (tG – tH) > 0, the MNE should seek to 
shift profits from the foreign affiliate g to the home affiliate h. This action by the MNE will 
increase country H’s CIT base and consequently its CIT revenues. Given these circumstances, 
country H has no incentive to spend scarce administrative resources monitoring the transfer pricing 
practices of a domestic affiliate in so far as it is engaging in intracompany transactions with the 
foreign affiliate g. There is simply no risk that the domestic affiliate h will seek to illegally shift 
profits to the foreign affiliate by strategically using transfer prices to understate the true profit 
earned in country H. If, however, affiliate g is engaging in intracompany transactions with affiliate 
h, country G should monitor affiliate g’s transfer-pricing practices to deter BEPS. Therefore, we 
assume 𝛾𝐺 > 0 and 𝛾𝐻 < 0. 




= −(1 − tI) (1 +
𝛾𝐼𝑆𝑖 
𝜋𝑖
𝑇 ) =  𝜆. (4) 
Where i = g or h, and I = G or H. Solving these two equations simultaneously for affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting results in the following expression: 








)  (5) 
The signs of the expressions on the right-hand-side of (5) implies that  𝑆𝑔
∗ > 0, meaning that affiliate 
g should shift profits to affiliate h. This in turn implies that affiliate g’s reported profits will be less 




than the true profits earned in country G. Finally, the constraint Sg + Sh = 0 implies that  𝑆ℎ
∗ = − 𝑆𝑔
∗ 
< 0, meaning that affiliate h is receiving inbound profit shifting, which, in turn, implies its reported 
profits are greater than the true profits earned in country H. According to (5), affiliate g’s optimal 
level of outbound profit shifting is positively related to tG – tH, inversely related to γG, and 
independent of γH  
Differentiating (5) by the policy parameters available to country G to deter BEPS, 


















2 (1 − tG)
< 0. (7) 
From (6), there is a positive relationship between the CIT-rate differential tG – tH and affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting, and (6) implies that there is a negative relationship 
between the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules γG and affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting. 
As previously discussed, the amount of illegal profit shifting among affiliates of an MNE 
is not observable; therefore, (6) and (7) are difficult to test empirically. Since an affiliate’s reported 
profits are observable, we recast the comparative static results derived above in terms of the effect 
of G’s policy parameters on affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits. Substituting (5) into (1) 
and differentiating the resulting expression by the policy parameters available to G to mitigate 
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)  > 0. (10) 
                                                          
4 Substituting (5) into (1) results in the following expression for affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits: 
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From (8), there is an inverse relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and 
the CIT-rate differential; (9) shows a positive relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of 
reported profits and the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules. 
Finally, (10) implies that increasing the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-
pricing rules decreases (in absolute value) the effect of the CIT-rate differential on affiliate g’s 
optimal level of reported profits. In other words, increasing the stringency with which a country 
enforces its transfer-pricing rules deters BEPS for every positive value of the CIT-rate differential 
between countries G and H. 
A graph illustrating the implications of (8) - (10) for the relationships between affiliate g’s 
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential may help in understanding the 
comparative static results of this model. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between affiliate g’s 
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential. As we will see, the relationships 
crucially depend on the stringency with which country G (H) enforces its transfer-pricing rules.  
The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents affiliate g’s reported profit 𝜋𝑔
𝑅∗and the horizontal 
axis represents the CIT-rate differential between countries G and H, which is denoted by (tG – tH). 
The CIT-rate differential can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. When the CIT-rate 
differential is equal to zero, there is no incentive for either affiliate to shift profits to the other; 
therefore, affiliate g’s reported profits are equal to its true profits when tG = tH. This point is labeled 
T on the vertical axis of Figure 1. Furthermore, if the reported profits of the affiliates are 
independent of the CIT-rate differential, then affiliate g’s reported profits would always be equal 
to its true profits. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that affiliate g’s true profit is exogeneous 
(i.e., independent of the CIT-rate differential), then affiliate g’s reported profit would equal its true 
profit for every value of (tG – tH). This case is illustrated by the horizontal line and labeled 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  and 
passing through point T. This line provides a useful reference in following discussion. 
According to (8) – (10), we must analyze three distinct cases. First, let’s suppose neither 
country adopts transfer-pricing rules in which case γG = γH = 0. In this case, there is an inverse 
relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and (tG – tH) This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝐶𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ . When (tG – tH)  < 0, then 
affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g in which case affiliate g’s 
reported profits are greater than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that that 




the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝐶𝑇̅̅̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s reported profits, lies 
above the line labelled 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s true profits. The vertical distance between 
𝐶𝑇̅̅̅̅  and  𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  represents affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting, which is equal to the 
amount of inbound profit shifting received by to affiliate g, for every value of (tG – tH) < 0.  
Now, let’s consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH > 0. In this situation, 
affiliate g has an incentive to shift profits to firm h, or 𝑆𝑔
∗ > 0, and, as a result, the reported profits 
of affiliate g are less than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that the negatively 
sloped line segment labeled 𝑇𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  , representing affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits, lies 
below the horizontal line labelled 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  , representing the true profits of affiliate g, for every value 
of tG – tH > 0. The vertical distance between 𝑇𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  and  𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅  represents affiliate g’s optimal level of 
outbound profit shifting at every value of (tG – tH) > 0.  
For purposes of interpreting the empirical model, it is important to observe that the inverse 
relationship between affiliate g’s reported profits and its optimal level of net outbound profit 
shifting, which can be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, is 
evident in Figure 1, as well. As we move from left to right along the horizontal axis, the CIT-rate 
differential is increasing; reported profits are decreasing; and affiliate g’s optimal amount of net 
outbound profit shifting is increasing. The negatively sloped line labeled 𝐶𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  illustrates (8) after 
setting γG = 0. 
Turning to the second case 2, consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH < 0. 
As previously discussed, affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g. Now, 
in contrast to the previous case, country H enforces its transfer-pricing rules to prevent BEPS. 
According to (10), enforcement decreases (in absolute value) outbound profit shifting by affiliate 
h, and, consequently, we assume γH > 0. The effect of country H enforcing its transfer-pricing rules 
on the optimal level of inbound profits being received by g with respect to the CIT-rate differential 
is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝐸𝑇 ̅̅ ̅̅̅. This line segment is 
not as steeply sloped as the line labeled 𝐶𝑇̅̅̅̅  because country H is enforcing its transfer-pricing 
rules. This has a deterrent effect on affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting thus 
decreasing the amount of inbound profits received by affiliate g at every value of  tG – tH < 0. 
The third case arises when tG – tH > 0, and country G enforces its transfer pricing rules to 
deter BEPS, thus γG > 0. Again, according to (10) enforcement decreases (in absolute value) 
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affiliate g’s optimal level of net outbound profit shifting at every value of tG – tH > 0. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝑇𝐹̅̅̅̅ . Again, this line segment 
is not as steeply sloped as the line segment 𝑇𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  because of the deterrent effect of country G 
enforcing its transfer-pricing rules on affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting. 
I conclude this section with a couple of final observations. First, the line segment labeled 
𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅  may not have a constant slope. Indeed, there should be a kink in 𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅   at the point labelled T on 
the vertical axis of Figure 1 if γG  ≠ γH, meaning that one country is enforcing its transfer-pricing 
rules, when it has the incentive to do so, more stringently than the other country. Consequently, 
the functional form of the empirical model should be flexible enough to permit the simultaneous 
estimation of three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profit. Second, for expository reasons, I 
assume that true profits are exogenous. If, however, a country’s CIT rate distorts the real activity 
of domestic affiliates of MNEs, as seems likely, then this could be illustrated in Figure 1 by rotating 
the three lines counter-clockwise about the point labeled T on the vertical axis. This also shows 
the necessity of controlling for true profits in the empirical model. 
4.  Sample construction, econometric specification, and variable construction 
In this section, we describe the data and the construction of the sample used to estimate the 
empirical model, the econometric specification of the empirical model of reported profits, and the 
variable construction. 
4.1  The data and sample construction 
To estimate the model, I use firm-level data. Such data are not readily available. At the moment, 
there are only three government entities that collect information on MNEs: The Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Operations and Management Companies Database in the U.S., 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on Direct Investments (MIDI), and the United Kingdom’s 
Office for National Statistics annual inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI). 
Unfortunately, these databases are not publicly available. Fortunately, some private institutions, 
such as Capital IQ (COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ Platform) and Bureau Van Dijk-BvD (Orbis 
and Amadeus), offer various platforms that contain information on company profits, costs, 
performance, and other indicators. These datasets are frequently used by firms providing 
accounting services to MNEs and by tax enforcement authorities, such as the IRS to take one 




example. These data are often used by scholars interested in corporate finance and international 
tax issues and are frequently cited in the academic literature.  
I construct a sample of affiliates of MNEs from the Orbis (BvD) database which contains 
information on over 200 million private companies worldwide. One of the limitations of using 
these data for the task at hand is that ownership information is only available for the most recent 
year of the data. Indeed, when applying the match of the current year to prior years, it is possible 
to obtain mismatches between parents and subsidiary firms, particularly when there have been 
mergers and acquisitions during the intervening years. As noted in previous studies that use these 
data (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Dischinger et al., 2014; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), this is an 
unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of using these data. Since mergers and acquisitions are 
relatively infrequent events, particularly during the time period spanned by my sample, I believe 
that any bias resulting from using these data is relatively small. 
I construct the sample, which I use to estimate the model, from the Orbis database by 
excluding firms with the following characteristics: subsidiaries firms, inactive firms, firms with 
losses, non-industrial firms (banks, hedge funds, foundations, insurance, public authorities, 
trustees, venture capital, and others), small firms as defined by Orbis and firms with an ultimate 
owner located in the same country.5 Ultimate owners are excluded from the sample to prevent 
perfect multicollinearity due to the adding-up constraint that profit-shifting must sum to zero. 
Loss-making firms are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific accounting 
rules; incorporating these rules into the empirical model is beyond the scope of the current study. 
After applying these exclusion criteria to the dataset, the resulting sample consists of 48,309 
subsidiaries for the period 2008 to 2014. Tables 1 and 2 report the number subsidiaries and ultimate 
owners in the sample by country, respectively. I augment the firm-level data with country-level 
data drawn from a variety of sources, as discussed in greater detail below.  
4.2  The econometric specification 
To test the predictions derived from the theoretical model, I adapt the econometric specification 
pioneered by HR and HL. More specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects, instrumental 
variables, panel data model: 
                                                          
5 Ultimate owners are excluded from the data set because the same semi-elasticity of BEPS is calculated using the 
differential between an affiliate of an MNE and its ultimate owner. 
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𝑟 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡)𝛾𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡)𝛾𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4𝛾𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽5𝛾𝐻𝑡 
+ 𝛽6 log(𝑘𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽7 log(𝑙𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝐺𝑡) + 𝛽9𝜔𝐺𝑡 + ∑ 𝜎𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑔𝑡. 
(10) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of affiliate g’s reported profits in country G and 
year t. The CIT-rate differential for countries G and H, respectively, in year t, is denoted by tGt - 
tHt, and, as discussed in greater detail below, 𝛾𝐺𝑡  and 𝛾𝐻𝑡 are dummy variables reflecting the 
stringency with which countries G and H, respectively, enforce their transfer-pricing rules while 
also accounting for their incentives to do so. The interaction terms involving the CIT-rate 
differential and the enforcement dummy variables provide the necessary flexibility to estimate the 
three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits predicted by the theory.  
The right-hand-side variables kgt and lgt, denote the value of firm g’s capital assets and labor 
costs, respectively. The variable aGt denotes country G’s real GDP per capita, which serves as a 
proxy variable for the rate of technological change. Following the methodology pioneered by HR, 
these variables are included in the model to control for the true profit earned by affiliate g in 
country G. The variable ωGt is a vector of country and time specific characteristics, namely indexes 
of trade freedom and political stability; ϭst is an industry-year fixed effect; and ugt is a stochastic-
error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. 
The model is estimated using an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous 
variables in (10) involving the CIT-rate differential. Following HR and HL, I use the log difference 
in the populations of the affiliates’ and ultimate owner’s host countries as an instrument for the 
potentially endogenous variable. The intuition behind using this instrument is that tax haven 
countries tend to be sparsely populated island countries, often located in the Caribbean. In contrast, 
high CIT-rate countries tend to be more populous OECD countries. I conduct Hausman-Wu 
specification tests for each model. These tests reject the null hypothesis that the variables involving 
the CIT-rate differential are exogeneous. I also conduct a Wright-Yogo test which rejects the null 
hypothesis that the log difference in populations is a weak instrument. In short, I believe that the 
log difference in populations is a valid instrument. It is sufficiently correlated with the potentially 
endogenous variables. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that it belongs in the model of 
reported profits; so the exclusion restriction is valid, as well. 
 




4.3  Construction of the variables 
The dependent variable is measured by the natural logarithm of reported earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT). Firm-level information on reported EBIT, the value of fixed assets, and labor 
costs by year are from the Orbis database. The CIT-rate differential is constructed using the 
maximum statutory CIT rates of an affiliate’s and ultimate owner’s host countries. These data 
come from Bloomberg and various issues of Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides, 
KPMG’s Global Corporate Tax Summaries, and Price-Waterhouse-Cooper’s Global Corporate 
Tax Summaries.  
The stringency with which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules is a dummy variable 
which is built by the product of two constructed variables. One of the constructed variables is a 
trichotomous variable reflecting the level of documentation that a country requires a domestic 
affiliate of MNE to submit with its CIT return. The second constructed variable is also a 
trichotomous variable reflecting the frequency with which a country applies penalties for violating 
its transfer-pricing documentation requirements. Information used to construct these variables 
comes from Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide and KPMG’s Transfer 
Pricing Review by country and by year. Table 3 summarizes the criteria used to construct the 
categorical variables measuring the level of a country’s documentation requirements and the 
frequency with which a country applies penalties for failing to comply with its transfer-pricing 
documentation requirements. 
The product of these two constructed categorical variables results in a variable with the 
following six values: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. For ease of reference, let’s refer to this variable as the 
stringency measure. The enforcement dummy variable in (10) is constructed by setting it equal to 
one when the stringency measure is greater than or equal to four, and zero otherwise. To test the 
robustness of the model, as discussed in greater detail below, I also estimate a specification in 
which the enforcement variable is set equal to one when the stringency measure is greater than or 
equal to five. This change in the definition of the enforcement dummy variable has no appreciable 
effect on the estimated coefficients. 
Data on GDP per capita and  the index of trade freedom by country and year come from 
the World Bank’s Development Indicators (World Bank Group) and the Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom, respectively. Table 4 reports sample summary statistics. 
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5.  The empirical results 
Now, we turn to the discussion of the empirical results. Since the focus of this research is obtaining 
consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, I report estimates of this parameter 
for a variety of specifications in Table 5. All specifications include a full set of firm and industry-
year fixed effects, and I report robust standard errors clustered at the MNE level.  
For the sake of comparison, I estimate a “first-generation model of reported profits,” using 
my sample. This specification does not include a control variable for countries with transfer pricing 
rules. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is reported in the row labelled First-
generation model and the second column of Table 5. The estimate is equal to -1.789 and it is 
distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. This estimate has the 
expected sign. The full set of estimated coefficients for this specification are reported in the second 
column of Table 6. For reasons previously discussed, I believe this model is misspecificied and 
the estimate of the semi-elasticity is inconsistent. 
Second-generation models include a variety of ways to control for whether a country has 
transfer-pricing rules. Accordingly, I estimate two versions of the second-generation model, using 
my sample. In version of the model that I refer to as the second-generation model A, I follow the 
practice in the literature of controlling for whether a country has adopted transfer-pricing rules by 
including a dummy variable equal to one when the subsidiary’s host country requires that the 
affiliates of MNEs submit documentation of their transfer-pricing practices. This generation of 
models includes an interaction term between the CIT-rate differential and the dummy variable 
controlling for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules. As a result, there are two distinct estimates 
of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. There is an estimate for the case in which the host country 
does not have transfer pricing rules, and there is an estimate for the case in which the host country 
of the subsidiary requires submission of documentation of the affiliates’ transfer pricing practices. 
The former estimate is reported in the row labelled Second-generation model A and the second 
column of Table 5. This estimate is equal to -1.589. Consistent with the theory, the estimate is 
negative and statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. The latter 
estimate is equal to -1.039; however, it is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of 
statistical significance. The estimated coefficients for this specification are reported in the third 
column of Table 6. 




In the specification that I refer to as the second-generation model B, I follow the practice 
in the literature of controlling for a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules, which may or may 
not include documentation of the affiliates’ transfer-pricing practices, by including a dummy 
variable set equal to one when the host country of the subsidiary has adopted transfer-pricing rules 
of some type and zero otherwise. I also include an interaction term between the CIT-rate 
differential and the dummy variable controlling for foreign subsidiary’s adoption of transfer-
pricing rules. The estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits are reported in the row 
labelled second-generation model B of Table 5 and are equal to -9.435 and -1.811, respectively. 
Consistent with the theory, the estimates are negative and statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance.  
Second-generation models are an improvement over first-generation model because they 
control for whether countries have adopted transfer-pricing rules. However, for these reasons 
previously discussed, these models are misspecified and the estimated semi-elasticities are 
inconsistent. These models do not account for which country – the host country of the subsidiary 
or of the ultimate owner – has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces these rules, and has the 
incentive to do so. 
Now, I estimate (10) in which I include a dummy variable to control for whether a country 
enforces its transfer-pricing rules and which country – the host of the affiliate or the ultimate owner 
-- has an incentive to do so. In this specification of the model, there are two interaction terms with 
the CIT-rate differential. There is an interaction term for the case in which the host country of the 
affiliate (ultimate owner) has adopted transfer-pricing rules and has the incentive to enforce them. 
Therefore, this specification results in three potentially distinct values of the semi-elasticity of 
reported profits.6 The estimated coefficients of this specification are reported in the fourth column 
of Table 6. 
The estimated semi-elasticity for the case in which neither country enforces its transfer-
pricing rules is reported in the row labeled Enforcement model 1 and the second column of Table 
5. The estimated semi-elasticity is equal to -3.540 and is distinguishable from zero at conventional 
                                                          












= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3, 
where the subscripts G and H are for the host country of the affiliate and ultimate owner, resespectively. 
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levels of statistical significance. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate 
differential results in a 35 percent decrease in reported profits, which is substantial. The estimate 
reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5 is for the case in which the foreign 
affiliate’s host country has adopted, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so because tG – 
tH > 0. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is equal to -3.063, meaning that a 
ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 30 percent decrease in 
reported profits. Consistent with the theory, this estimate is negative and statistically 
distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level. Furthermore, it is somewhat greater (in absolute 
value) than the previous estimate when countries do not enforce transfer-pricing rules. As reported 
in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5, the semi-elasticity of reported profits is 
equal to -1.286 and is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5-percent level. This semi-
elasticity corresponds to the case in which the ultimate owner’s host country has adopted transfer-
pricing rules, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so because tG – tH < 0. This estimate 
implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 13 percent 
decrease in reported profits. As predicted by the theory, this estimate is smaller (in absolute value) 
than the estimate when neither country enforces its rules. It is also interesting to note that the 
estimates for the cases when the subsidiary’s and ultimate owner’s host countries have the 
incentive to enforce their rules differ, as well. 
Now, I estimate (10) on two subsamples to test the key assumption that accounting for the 
incentive of a country to enforces its transfer-pricing rules is important for correctly specifying a 
model of reported profits. In the row labeled Enforcement 2, I report the estimates of the semi-
elasticities of reported profits on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is positive or (tG 
– tH) > 0. In this case, the affiliate’s host country G has an incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing 
rules to mitigate BEPS, but the ultimate owner’s host country does not. Consistent with the theory, 
the semi-elasticity for the case in which the host country of the affiliate has the incentive to enforce 
its rules is negative and statistically distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level, but, as 
predicted by theory, the estimate when the ultimate owner’s host country enforces its rules but has 
no incentive to do so is indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical 
significance. I repeat the same exercise on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is 
negative or (tG – tH) < 0. In this case, the ultimate owner’s host country has an incentive to enforce 




its rules but the foreign affiliate’s host country does not. The estimated semi-elasticities for this 
subsample are reported in the row labelled Enforcement model 2. Consistent with the theory, the 
semi-elasticity for the case in which the ultimate owner’s host country has the incentive to enforce 
its rules, which is reported in column 3 of Table 5, is negative and statistically different from zero 
at conventional levels of significance. And, as predicted by the theory, the estimate for the case in 
which the foreign affiliate’s host country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so because 
(tG – tH) < 0 is indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. These 
placebo estimates provide important evidence that is consistent with the theory. In specifying a 
model of reported profits, the functional form should be sufficiently flexible to permit the 
estimation of three semi-elasticities of reported profits. Furthermore, the construction of the 
enforcement dummy variable should account for not only whether the country has adopted rules 
and enforces them but should also account for whether the country has the incentive to enforce its 
rules given the tax incentives facing domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany 
transactions with foreign affiliates. The estimated coefficients obtained from these two subsamples 
are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 7. 
To gauge the robustness of the main results to alternative specifications, estimate a 
specification of the model in which I add a control variable for political stability. The estimated 
coefficients of this specification are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 8. This model is estimated 
on the full sample and the two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients have 
the expected signs and statistical significance. Next, I examine the robustness of my main findings 
to an alternative definition of the stringency with which a country enforces its rules. More 
specifically, I redefine γGt and γHt to be equal to one when the constructed categorical variable for 
the frequency of applying penalties is equal to or greater than six rather than four as in the case of 
the previous specifications. The estimated coefficients of this specification are reported in columns 
4-6 of Table 8. Again, I estimate this specification on the full sample and the two subsamples 
previously described. The estimated coefficients of this specification have the expected signs and 
statistical significance. 
6.  Policy simulation  
To illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical 
model of reported profits, I report describe the results of a policy simulation in this section. For 
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purposes of the simulation, I assume the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent. A 20 
percent cut in the top statutory CIT rate of the U.S. would be equivalent to a tax rate of 15 percent, 
instead of the current-law rate of 35 percent. This proposal is particularly relevant because the 
United States has one of the highest top statutory CIT rates in the world, and there is an ongoing 
policy debate about the merits of the United States reducing its top statutory CIT rate to make it 
more competitive with that of other countries.  
For the sake of comparison, I use the estimated semi-elasticities for reported profits 
obtained from the First–generation model reported and Enforcement model 1, which are reported 
in the corresponding rows of Table 5, to provide two estimates of the policy simulation. The 
estimates for the policy simulation based on the First-generation model of the effect of the proposal 
on the percent change in reported CIT revenue by country and on the percent change in aggregate 
reported firm EBIT by country are reported in columns two and three, respectively, of Table 9, 
Similarly, the estimates for the policy simulation based on the Enforcement 1 model are reported 
in columns four and five, of Table 9.7  
There are three noteworthy findings in Table 9. First, every country, except the United 
States, experiences a decrease in aggregate reported firm revenue. In contrast, the U.S. experiences 
an increase in aggregate reported firm revenue as a result. Second, every country, including the 
U.S., experiences a decrease in CIT revenue. In the case of the U.S., this finding shows that the 
increase in the CIT tax base or aggregate reported firm revenue is not large enough to offset the 
effect of the 20 percent reduction in the U.S. CIT rate. For the other countries, the decrease in CIT 
revenues is proportional to the decrease in the country’s CIT tax base as a result of the proposal 
because they do not change their current-law CIT rate. Third, and most importantly for the 
purposes at hand, the estimated effect of the proposed reform on the percent decrease in CIT 
revenues for the U.S. is 15 percentages points smaller using estimates obtained from the 
Enforcement 1 model relative to that based on the First-generation model. In sum, this exercise 
illustrates the practical importance of using a correctly specified model to estimate the effect on 
reported profits of CIT-rate differentials for tax policy analysis. 
                                                          
7 The simulation for the first generation model I used column 1 if Table 6. 7 To run the simulation for the 
enforcement model I used column 4 if Table 6 




7.  Conclusions 
As globalization increases so has international tax competition among countries to attract 
foreign direct investment. The resulting CIT-rate differentials among countries is leading to BEPS 
as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate countries to affiliates located in low 
CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities thus increasing their worldwide after-
tax profits.  
This paper seeks to gauge the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on BEPS. I 
improve upon the existing literature by accounting for whether countries actually enforce their 
transfer-pricing rules and when they have the incentive to do so because of the tax incentives facing 
domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong evidence that correctly specifying the model of 
reported profits in the manner prescribed in this paper has important implications for the correct 
choice of function form and a substantial effect on the estimated semi-elasticities of reported 
profits. I also conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy 
analysis. I use my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an 
estimate of this semi-elasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the policy 
simulation. This exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a correctly 
specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated tax revenue effect of the proposed reform. 
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Figure 1. The Optimal Reported Profits of Affiliate g with Respect to the Corporate 
















Note: The slope of the line segment labelled 𝐶𝐷̅̅ ̅̅  corresponds to 𝛽1 in the econometric 
specification (10), when 𝛾𝐺 = 𝛾𝐻 = 0. The slope of the line segment labelled 𝑇𝐹̅̅̅̅  is corresponds 
to 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 in the econometric specification (10), when 𝛾𝐺 > 0 and 𝛾𝐻 = 0. The slope of the line 
segment labeled 𝐸𝑇̅̅ ̅̅  corresponds to 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 in the econometric specification, when 𝛾𝐺 = 0 and 
𝛾𝐻 = 0.  
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Table 1. Number of affiliates in the sample by country 
Country Number of affiliates 
1. Australia 5 
2. Austria 895 
3. Belgium 2,959 
4. Britain 4,386 
5. Cyprus 39 
6. Czech 3,108 
7. Denmark 1,194 
8. Estonia 631 
9. Finland 886 
10. France 6,161 
11. Germany 3,584 
12. Hong Kong 5 
13. Iceland 14 
14. Ireland 743 
15. Italy 4,044 
16. Japan 156 
17. Luxembourg 40 
18. Netherlands 779 
19. New Zealand 725 
20. Norway 1,273 
21. Portugal 1,858 
22. Slovakia 1,892 
23. Slovenia 546 
24. South Korea 995 
25. Spain 3,838 
26. Sweden 2280 
27. Switzerland 46 
28. United States 21 
Total number of affiliates  43,103 
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Andorra 10 Greece 42 Peru 1 
Angola 9 Guinea-Bissau 1 Philippines 3 
Argentina 13 Hong Kong 165 Poland 184 
Australia 490 Hungary 73 Portugal 255 
Austria 1,300 Iceland 52 Romania 26 
Bahamas 30 India 291 Russian Federation 102 
Bahrain 3 Indonesia 4 Saint Vincent 4 
Barbados 2 Ireland 504 Saudi Arabia 24 
Belarus 2 Israel 172 Serbia 10 
Belgium 1,058 Italy 1,825 Seychelles 21 
Bermuda 198 Japan 2,295 Singapore 174 
Bosnia 5 Korea, Republic of 231 Slovakia 87 
Brazil 60 Kuwait 24 Slovenia 40 
Bulgaria 31 Latvia 34 South Africa 50 
Canada 450 Lebanon 36 Spain 1,171 
Cayman Isl. 196 Liechtenstein 107 Sri Lanka 4 
Chile 18 Lithuania 43 Sweden 1,726 
China 319 Luxembourg 1626 Switzerland 1,961 
Colombia 14 Macedonia 1 Syria 1 
Costa Rica 2 Malaysia 58 Taiwan 142 
Croatia 47 Malta 104 Thailand 12 
Cyprus 287 Marshall Islands 17 Tunisia 10 
Czech Rep. 291 Mauritius 21 Turkey 73 
Denmark 1,281 Mexico 50 Ukraine 43 
Ecuador 1 Monaco 22 UAE 91 
Egypt 3 Morocco 8 United Kingdom 2,921 
Estonia 18 Namibia 1 United States 7,234 
Finland 777 Netherlands 1,992 Uruguay 3 
France 2,957 New Zealand 63 Venezuela 8 
Georgia 1 Norway 811 Viet Nam 2 
Germany 6,107 Panama 67 Total 43,103 
 
  




Table 3. Coding of the categorical variables according to a country’s transfer-
pricing documentation requirements and application penalties for violations 












Reference Guide  
Information 




to be submitted 























to be prepared 
when requested 
Documents are 
required when a 
firm is audited and 
a firm has some 
time to prepare 
them. 





along with the 
tax return 
Documents need 
to be ready when 
requested. 
Increasing   Medium risk  
3 Yes 
Documents need 
to be summited 
with the annual 
CIT return  
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Minimum Maximum Source 
CIT-rate differential (tG – tH) -0.022 0.090 -0.425 0.407 Author 
Average CIT-rate differential 0.009 0.041 -0.167 0.190 Author 
Enforcement regime by the 
subsidiary’s host country 
0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 Author 
Enforcement by the ultimate 
owner’s host country 
0.656 0.475 0.000 1.000 Author 
Transfer-pricing rules in the 
subsidiary’s host country 
0.991 0.091 0.000 1.000 Author 
Transfer-pricing rules in the 
ultimate owner’s host country 
0.909 0.288 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Transfer-pricing documentation 
required by the subsidiary’s host 
country 
0.149 0.357 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Transfer-pricing documentation 
required by the ultimate owner’s 
host country 
0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Log(subsidiary’s reported profits) 6.426 1.836 -11.236 15.614 ORBIS 
Log(value of fixed assets) 6.559 2.626 -6.001 17.635 Author 
Log(labor costs) 7.610 1.554 -4.977 16.486 Author 
Log(GDP per capita) 10.521 0.386 9.592 11.667 ORBIS 
Index of trade freedomc 68.442 15.544 38.500 96.000 ORBIS 
Index of political stability  0.698 0.392 -0.466 1.514 World Bank 
 
  




Table 5. Instrumental variable estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits 
Empirical specification 




β1 + β2 
(country H has no 
incentive to enforce 
its transfer-pricing 
rules)  
β1 + β3 
(country G has no 
incentive to enforce 
its transfer-pricing 
rules) 
 Models are estimated on the full sample 
First-generation model -1.789*** - - 
Second-generation model A -1.589*** -1.039 - 
Second-generation model B -9.435* -1.811*** - 
Enforcement model 1 -3.54*** -3.063* -1.286** 
 Model is estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH > 0 
Enforcement model 2 -4.741* -3.225* -1.648 
 Models are estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH < 0 
Enforcement model 3 -4.438* -4.040 -1.041* 
Note: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The 
second-generation model A includes a dummy variable = 1 if the subsidiary’s host country requires transfer-pricing 
documentation to be submitted with the affiliate’s annual CIT return and zero otherwise. The second-generation model 
B includes a dummy variable = 1 if the for the subsidiary’s host country has adopted transfer-pricing rules and zero 
otherwise. The enforcement model includes a dummy variable = 1 if the host country of the subsidiary enforces transfer-
pricing rules. The instrument for the potentially endogenous variable (CIT-rate differential) is the log of the difference 
in populations of the two countries.  
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Existence of transfer-pricing 










Enforcement by subsidiary’s 
host country (E-SHC) 
- - - 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
E-SHC ×(tG – tH ) - - - 
0.477** 
(0.189) 
Enforcement by ultimate 
owner’s host country (E-UHC) 
- - - 
-0.081*** 
(0.019) 
E-OHC ×(tG – tH ) - - - 
2.254** 
(0.928) 




































Number of observations 190,862 190,862 190,862 190,862 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.048 
Number of subsidiaries 38,314 38,314 38,314 38,314 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates 
statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries 
of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-
year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level). 
















(tG – tH) < 0 








Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the 













Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the 





































Number of observations 190,862 80,702 107,730 
R-squared 0.048 0.041 0.053 
Number of affiliates 38,314 17,137 22,475 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates 
statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries 
of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-
year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level).
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Table 8. Robustness of the main results to the inclusion of a political stability index and to an alternative 
definition of enforcement 
Variable 
Includes an index of political stability Alternative definition of enforcement 
Sample Sample 
Full (tG – tH) > 0 (tG – tH) < 0 Full (tG – tH) > 0 (tG – tH) < 0 
CIT-rate differential 




































































































































(0.0263) - - - 
       
Number of 
observations 
190,862 80,702 107,730 190,862 80,702 107,730 
R-squared 0.048 0.041 0.053 0.048 0.041 0.053 
Number of affiliates 38,314 17,137 22,475 38,314 17,137 22,475 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The estimates of 
reported in right-hand-side panel of the table uses an alternative definition the dummy variable for a country’s enforcement of transfer-
pricing rules. The dummy variable = 1.0 when the constructed categorical variable is greater than or equal to 5 (rather than 4) and zero 
otherwise. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates statistical 
significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All 
specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-
digit level). 
  




Table 9. Policy simulation of the effect of the United States decreasing its CIT rate by 20 percent  
Country 
Based on the first-generation model Based on the enforcement model  
Percent change 
in tax revenue by 
country 
Percent change  
in the sum of 
affiliate’s  
reported profits by 
country 
Percent change 
in tax revenue by 
country 
Percent change  
in the sum of 
affiliate’s  
reported profits by 
country 
Austria -4.48 -4.48 -2.53 -2.53 
Belgium -5.79 -5.79 -4.34 -4.34 
Britain -8.33 -8.33 -6.25 -6.25 
Czech -3.22 -3.22 -2.41 -2.41 
Denmark -5.40 -5.40 -2.67 -2.67 
Estonia -1.76 -1.76 -1.32 -1.32 
Finland -5.13 -5.13 -3.85 -3.85 
France -4.88 -4.88 -3.66 -3.66 
Germany -5.29 -5.29 -2.62 -2.62 
Iceland -4.32 -4.32 -3.24 -3.24 
Ireland -9.03 -9.03 -6.78 -6.78 
Italy -5.03 -5.03 -3.77 -3.77 
Japan -6.27 -6.27 -4.71 -4.71 
Netherlands -5.91 -5.91 -4.43 -4.43 
New Zealand -8.91 -8.91 -6.69 -6.69 
Norway -3.22 -3.22 -2.42 -2.42 
Portugal -3.09 -3.09 -1.53 -1.53 
Slovakia -2.31 -2.31 -1.63 -1.64 
Slovenia -2.48 -2.48 -1.86 -1.86 
South Korea -5.56 -5.56 -3.93 -3.93 
Spain -4.65 -4.65 -2.47 -2.47 
Sweden -4.35 -4.35 -3.27 -3.27 
United States -28.36 43.29 -35.55 28.91 
Note: The percent change in tax revenue is percent difference in proposed-law tax revenue with respect to current-law tax 
revenue by country. The percent change in affiliate’s reported profits is the percent change in the difference in the sum of 
affiliates’ reported profits revenue under proposed law with respect to affiliates’ reported profits under current law. 
